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If one were to judge a book by its cover, a black bound tome of 400 plus 
pages entitled Judicial Ethics in Australia would not be off to a promising 
start. Sombre appearances can sometimes deceive: Thomas’s book, now in its 
third edition, makes for an informative and, at times, entertaining read.  
This subject matter of Judicial Ethics in Australia is important. Its primary 
audience is likely to consist of presiding and retired judicial officers. The 
book’s significance, however, extends beyond the sage advice it gives to 
judges. Judges exercise enormous power over other members of society and 
they are not democratically elected. Thomas, a former judge of the 
Queensland Court of Appeal, mounts a compelling case that judicial power 
must be exercised ethically if it is to be legitimate. As Thomas reminds us, 
judges, not courtrooms, constitute courts. If the rule of law is to be 
maintained, there must be an independent and impartial judiciary that adheres 
to very high standards of behaviour both in and outside of court. Unethical 
behaviour by judges is corrosive of the rule of law and undermines public 
confidence in the judiciary.  
Judicial ethics also have constitutional implications. Over the last two 
decades, numerous constitutional cases have come before the High Court in 
which it has been argued that the separation of powers has been breached. In 
some cases, litigants maintain that a power which is incapable of being 
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exercised judicially has been impermissibly conferred on a judge; in other 
cases, litigants contend that judicial power has been conferred on a person 
who is not a judge. The result is a large, complex and unsettled body of case 
law which sheds little light on the demarcation between judicial and non-
judicial power. Much of this complexity can be distilled into a central 
question: what is a judge? In Judicial Ethics in Australia, Thomas 
demonstrates comprehensively that one of the essential qualities of a judge is 
an adherence to a coherent and justifiable body of ethical principles.  
Judges, of course, occupy a unique constitutional position. Their position is 
secured by the fixing of judicial salaries and tenure, which protects a judge 
from removal except where she or he has engaged in serious misconduct. As 
judges are not subject, in all but the most extreme cases, to external discipline 
(short of what Thomas refers to as the ‘death penalty of removal’1
In Chapter 1 (‘Origins’), Thomas argues that the drawn-out saga of the 
Murphy affair in Australia in the 1980s demonstrated the need for clarity 
about what is acceptable and unacceptable judicial behaviour. The confusion 
about whether the late Lionel Murphy’s conduct justified his removal from his 
position as a Justice of the High Court of Australia, and also about the process 
by which that judgment could be made, prompted Thomas to write the first 
edition of Judicial Ethics in Australia in 1988.  
), it is 
extremely important that they are mindful of their ethical obligations. As put 
by former High Court Chief Justice Sir Gerard Brennan in 1997, in his 
foreword to the second edition of Judicial Ethics in Australia, judicial 
standards are enforced immediately by conscience.  
In Chapter 2 (‘The Term “Judicial Ethics”’), Thomas identifies three primary 
imperatives underlying our system of judicial ethics. They are (i) 
independence, (ii) impartiality, and (iii) service to humanity. He then goes on 
to describe judicial good behaviour (sometimes labelled judicial propriety) as 
a ‘practical necessity without which the system would fail because the 
necessary public trust in the law would not exist’.2
In Chapter 3 (‘General Tests for Determining Whether Conduct is Unethical’) 
Thomas sets out a general test for establishing professional unethical conduct. 
He describes the shift from the classic, common law, peer-based test in 
Allinson v General Council of Medical Education & Registration,
  
3
                                                 
1 James Thomas, Judicial Ethics in Australia (3rd ed, 2009) 318. 
 to a more 
2 Thomas, above n 1, 11. 
3 [1894] 1 QB 750. In Allison Lord Escher MR stated that professional misconduct is 
established ‘if it is shown that a medical man in the pursuit of his profession has done 
something with regard to it which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or 
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contemporary, consumer-oriented, statutory test which is based on the 
standards of competence and diligence that a member of the Australian public 
is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner.4
Although Thomas would be the first to admit that the distinction between 
judicial misconduct in office and ‘non-official misconduct’ is a blurred one in 
many instances, the next nine chapters of Judicial Ethics in Australia are 
organised around that distinction. Chapters 4 (‘Misconduct in Office’) and 5 
(‘Bias and Prejudice’) detail what misconduct in office is for a judge. 
Chapters 6 (‘Non-Official Misconduct’), 7 (‘Community and Media 
Relations’), 8 (‘Community Organisations and Social Conduct’), 9 (‘Financial 
Dealings’), 10 (‘Immorality and Crime’), 11 (‘Politics, Commissions, and 
Dealing with Government Officials’) and 12 (‘Politics, Commissions, and 
Dealing with Government Officials’) all deal with non-official misconduct.  
 
The importance of judges meeting community expectations of satisfactory 
judicial behaviour pervades the rest of Judicial Ethics in Australia. Thomas 
also convincingly rebuts the erroneous proposition propounded by some with 
respect to the Murphy affair, that professional misconduct for a judge can 
only be constituted by misconduct in the performance of the duties of office, 
or by conviction for a (serious) criminal offence. As we might expect, Thomas 
casts the net of judicial misbehaviour much wider.  
I would expect that Chapters 4 through to 12 of Judicial Ethics in Australia 
will provide an invaluable practical resource for any judicial officer. 
Thomas’s treatment of the material is well researched and comprehensive. He 
articulates the relevant general principles, and provides numerous detailed 
examples of where judges have gone wrong. While the chapters are dense 
reading at times, some of these examples proffered by Thomas are hilarious. 
In the pages of Judicial Ethics in Australia one encounters the ‘mooning’ 
magistrate,5 the battery-operated dildo of Judge Geiler of the Los Angeles 
Municipal Court,6 the digitus impudicus of Californian Judge Spruance,7
                                                                                                                    
dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency’: at 763. The test 
was later applied to lawyers: see Re a Solicitor; Ex parte The Law Society [1912] 1 KB 302 
referred to in Thomas, above n 1, 13, n 2. 
 and 
4 See, for example, the definition of ‘unsatisfactory professional conduct’ in s 4.4.2 of the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Vic).  
5 Thomas above n 1, 167. According to Thomas, the Lord Chancellor, who was responsible for 
disciplining magistrates in the United Kingdom, ‘did not like what he saw’. The magistrate 
was dismissed from office. 
6 Judge Geiler’s battery-operated dildo was used to threaten a prolix cross examiner in court: 
  Defender: One or two questions, Your Honour, then I won’t take any more of your 
    time on this case. 
  His Honour: Get the machine out. 
  The Clerk: The battery? 
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the noise effects machine of Floridian Judge Sheldon Shapiro.8 If there were a 
prize for judicial obstinacy, perhaps it should be awarded to the judge from 
North Carolina who failed to disqualify himself on the grounds of bias in a 
case where he was the defendant(!).9
Chapter 13 (‘To Whom the Standards Apply’) contains some interesting 
statistics about judges in Australia. The overwhelming majority of the 1000 or 
so judicial officers in Australia are magistrates or inferior court judges. One 
would suspect, based purely on those numbers, that judicial misconduct is 
most likely to occur in the lower courts. Thomas also argues that what he 
terms the ‘quasi-judiciary’ – that is, the plethora of tribunal members in the 
various Australian jurisdictions – needs to comply with ethical standards, and 
that these ethical standards, although not identical to the standards that are 
imposed upon judges, must still be founded on judicial ethics. Given that there 
are approximately 6500 persons now working as members of tribunals in 
Australia,
 Well may those of us in Australia say, 
‘Only in America!’  
10
Chapter 14 (‘Enforcement’) contains a detailed account of both the formal and 
informal systems of enforcement of judicial standards that operate in the 
various Australian jurisdictions. Particular attention is paid to New South 
Wales which, partly as a result of the Murphy saga and the corruption 
conviction of the former Chief Magistrate of New South Wales, Murray 
Farquhar, in 1985, has had both a Judicial Commission and an Independent 
Commission Against Corruption since the late 1980s. While Thomas is not an 
outright critic of the New South Wales judicial commission system, he is no 
unabashed fan. As he details later in his book, Thomas believes that a 
standing judicial commission, which is empowered to deal with minor 
complaints against judicial officers, has the potential to erode judicial 
independence through excessive executive interference.  
 there is clearly a great deal of important work that remains to be 
done in developing a coherent body of quasi-judicial ethical standards. 
                                                                                                                    
  His Honour: The battery. 
  Defender: I have no further questions Your Honour. 
 See Thomas, above n 1, 54-5. Judge Geiler’s threatened use of the dildo, along with numerous 
other indiscretions, led to his dismissal from office. 
7 In addition to showing a tardy litigant the digitus impudicus (literally ‘impudent finger’), 
Judge Spruance ‘emitted a “raspberry” to indicate disbelief of a witness testifying on his own 
behalf’: see Thomas above n 1, 29. 
8 Thomas above n 1, 29. Judge Shapiro’s machine made toilet flushing sounds while defence 
counsel in a rape trial presented his argument. 
9 See Re Martin 275 SE 2d 412 (NC, 1981) referred to in Thomas, above n 1, 77. 
10 According to Thomas: see Thomas, above n 1, 238. 
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Chapter 15 (‘Restraints after Retirement’) is a useful addition to the book. We 
are living longer, and are being urged to work into later life. Yet all 
jurisdictions in Australia have mandatory judicial retirement ages, and many 
judges are forced to retire with many years left of potentially productive 
working life. In addition, there appears to be an increasing trend for judicial 
officers to leave the bench well before the mandatory retirement age, and to 
go back into an active legal practice. Post-judicial retirement activity can give 
rise to ethical conundrums, and Thomas attempts to address some of them in 
this chapter. In passing, it should be noted that Thomas displays a distinct 
preference for judges who are prepared to accept that judicial appointment is 
the culmination of a legal career, rather than a mere stepping-stone to 
something else.  
Chapter 16 (‘An Historical Perspective’) is probably the most interesting 
chapter in Judicial Ethics in Australia for the lay reader. The chapter contains 
a brief but sweeping historical survey of judicial ethics and judicial 
independence dating back to Moses, and then proceeding through the Tudor 
and Stuart periods to the twentieth century. It also has a section which focuses 
specifically on developments in the United States of America. This historical 
survey is interesting because it reveals that current expectations of judicial 
behaviour are the culmination of many centuries of development, and that the 
struggle for judicial independence did not begin or end with the Act of 
Settlement in 1701. Judicial behaviour that was acceptable in the 18th or 19th 
centuries, or even in the early 20th century, would not be acceptable today.  
In the final Chapter 17 (‘The Future’), Thomas studies a number of systems 
for providing an effective means of dealing with complaints against judicial 
officers. His study takes in the experiences of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Canada, as well as a number of Australian proposals. Thomas’s 
conclusion is that the relative infrequency of instances of judicial misconduct 
in Australia means that the establishment of a system which disciplines judges 
for minor misconduct, or the creation of permanent judicial commissions, is 
not justified. Where an allegation or complaint is made which could, if 
proven, justify a judge’s removal, Thomas argues for a system of standing or 
dormant panels. These panels would consist of designated serving or retired 
judicial officers who could be summoned at short notice to form a three 
person commission of inquiry with broad investigatory powers. After 
investigation, the commission of inquiry would then have to make a 
recommendation to the parliament as to whether or not the allegation is made 
out, and as to whether or not the judge should be removed. Thomas maintains 
that, while a commission of inquiry’s recommendation for removal should be 
a prerequisite to any parliamentary decision, ultimately the power of removal 
should remain with the legislature. Readers may note that Thomas’s ideal 
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system is very similar to the system that is now found in the Victorian 
Constitution.11
Judicial Ethics in Australia contains a very detailed and interesting dissection 
of the Murphy affair, as well as the controversy that engulfed Justice Vasta of 
the Queensland Supreme Court in the wake of the Fitzgerald Inquiry in the 
1980s. It also contains some fascinating material on the behind-the-scenes 
political machinations of Sir John Latham, Hebert Vere Evatt and Sir Edmund 
Herring (amongst others), all whilst occupying high judicial office. 
Disappointingly, there is no discussion of what many would regard as the 
most spectacular Australian example of judicial misconduct at the highest 
level, that of the Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Garfield Barwick, 
meeting privately with Sir John Kerr, the Governor-General, in the days 
before the Whitlam dismissal in 1975. 
  
Overwhelmingly this book is very well researched and very informative. It is 
a sound work of scholarship. If there is one complaint to be made of Judicial 
Ethics in Australia, it is of its generally conservative tone. Thomas appears to 
be of the old school (not that there is anything wrong with that), but, at times, 
his treatment of such issues as gender bias, worthy though it is, may be 
regarded by some as misconceived. The bogey of political correctness looms 
large. For example, for Thomas, the trial judge who must sum up the evidence 
for a jury in a contemporary rape trial is negotiating a minefield: 
[I]t is necessary for judges to articulate the strengths or weakness of the 
particular case, and they would be false to their oath if, through fear of 
adverse publicity, they fail to put both sides in any arguable case. Judges 
must not bend their attitudes so far towards female viewpoints that they end 
up making or encouraging biased judgments against men. … [J]udges 
should not lean too far backwards or be timid in order to demonstrate 
political correctness or sexual enlightenment. If they lean too far they may 
lose their sense of reality and fail to dispense justice without fear or 
favour.12
My most serious complaint about the conservative tone of Judicial Ethics in 
Australia concerns its treatment of another favourite bogeyman, judicial 
activism. At the outset, some might say that Thomas’s inclusion of judicial 
activism as a form of unethical judicial behaviour is a bit rich. Moreover, 
Thomas makes a number of sweeping claims about judicial activism that do 
not bear up. The ‘excesses of that period’
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 (referring primarily to the High 
12 Thomas, above n 1, 96 (emphasis added). 
13 Thomas, above n 1, 38. 
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Court from 1987 to 1995 under Chief Justice Sir Anthony Mason) are 
illustrated, for example, by Toohey and Deane JJ’s dissent in Leeth v 
Commonwealth.14 According to Thomas, Toohey and Deane JJ in Leeth 
‘framed an implied right to equality before the law which would have given 
judges the power to declare legislation invalid on the footing that a judge held 
its effect to be unreasonable or disproportionate to any legitimate end’.15
The role of judges is changing. Judicial ethics are also changing. In Victoria, 
we have recently witnessed a public spat between the Victorian Attorney-
General, Robert Hulls, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria, 
Marilyn Warren, about the extent to which judges should engage the public in 
explaining and justifying the work that they do. With the passage of statutory 
human rights instruments such as the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities, it is likely that judges will be increasingly involved in 
contentious and policy-laden decision making. It is a common criterion in 
these statutory instruments that limitations on human rights are lawful if they 
can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.
 Now 
whatever one might say about the High Court’s flirtation with the implied 
right to legal equality, it was certainly never intended to operate as a right 
which would warrant a judge applying a general test of proportionality to all 
laws to determine their constitutional validity. At its highest, the implied right 
promoted substantive legal equality and was only engaged when a law singled 
out a person or discernable class of persons for discriminatory treatment. 
Thomas’s broadside attack on judicial activism leaves little room for 
legitimate judicial law making, and does not acknowledge the role that a 
judge’s political and policy views play in the development of the law. While it 
can be acknowledged that inferior court judges only have a limited role in 
judicial law making, and that they must largely buckle down under the 
discipline of precedent, Thomas’s strictures have far less relevance to superior 
and appellate court judges. By contrast, Thomas’s several page digression on 
‘Issue Bias’ in Chapter 5 displays a nuanced understanding of the way judges’ 
values influence their judicial decision making.  
16
                                                 
14 (1992) 174 CLR 455. 
 For judges 
to be able to make that sort of assessment, they must remain engaged with the 
society in which they live. Although Thomas is characteristically cautious 
about what judges should or should not do, he does not advocate that judges 
should live like monks, or work like saints. Rather, he provides an invaluable 
resource for judges to guide them ethically in their work in court, and in the 
lives they lead in the community.  
15 Thomas, above n 1, 38. 
16 See, for example, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 7(2). 
